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Unless we develop a new strategic vision,
"o we will make little or no progress in fashioning a more successful economic assistance program; o the remaining public and Congressional support for economic aid will continue to erode; and "o we may soon lose much of the existing funding levels.
Without a credible strategic vision for economic assistance, the President may soon find himself without a principal instrument for developing partnerships with the developing and transitional economies --whose stability and prosperity is proving increasingly more important to us as we enter the twentyfirst century.
INTRODUCTION
When Alice asked, "Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?" the Cheshire cat replied, "that depends a good deal on where you want to get to."'
In a time of domestic economic uncertainty and stunning international change, the United States' foreign economic assistance programs are threatened because they lack direction.
We do not know "where we want to get to" with economic aid. We don't have a clear and convincing answer to the question of why --with the end of the Cold War --we should still provide economic aid to poor countries and nations like Russia engaged in difficult transitions.
The main purpose of this paper is to propose a new strategic vision for all U.S. economic assistance programs that will be relevant for U.S. interests in the twenty-first century.
This paper discusses the need for a new vision for economic aid; the criteria this new vision must satisfy; and its strategic goals. It ends with a plan by which the Executive Branch can reach a political agreement with Congress and the major interest groups concerned with economic aid. The paper does not discuss how A.I.D. or other aid agencies should be restructured or the specifics of redirecting aid programs. These are important issues. But until our aims are clear and agreed on, our aid institutions and mechanisms have no long-term viability.
II. WHAT'S AT STAKE
After forty-five years of post-World War II U.S. economic assistance, survival of these aid programs is seriously threatened. Support is declining because of years of weak Executive Branch leadership, muddled aims, and growing public criticism.
Most of all, support has declined because of economic aid's apparent lack of relevance to the world the U.S. will face in the twenty-first century.
Since the end of the Cold War, no
one has yet formulated a convincing answer to the question of why U.S. economic assistance to other countries is still important to
U.S. interests and values.
Under the pressure of pending domestic spending cuts and tax increases, overall funding levels for bilateral and multilateral aid programs will likely drop substantially --unless someone answers the fundamental question. 
Recent ProDosals for Restructuring Economic Assistance
Recent proposals for overhauling economic assistance range from a single clear objective to many strategic goals. Table 3 in Annex A summarizes the main points of the most prominent of these proposals.
If we limit economic assistance strategy to a single broad objective --such as broad-based and environmentally sustainable growth --American aid can address only part of our interests in the developing world. In East and Southeast Asia, where economic growth is quite rapid, our trade and investment objectives may be relatively more important than our development objectives. In the Middle East and South Asia, we may use economic aid to prevent future regional conflicts. In assisting the transitional economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, we are employing our aid to maintain a stable and secure Europe. A new strategic vision that meets these criteria can secure bi-partisan Congressional support and make sense to the American people.
Developing public support will require a vigorous media and public education campaign by all major stakeholders.
A Viable Strateqic Vision for Econonic Assistance and Cooeration
To meet the criteria discussed above, U.S. economic assistance programs should focus on four strategic objectives: Law enforcement and national security constituencies focus on narcotics traffic, terrorism, and immigration. In Congress, those interested in these issues cut across a wide swath of committees.
In summary, this strategic vision meets the criteria discussed earlier for a twenty-first century vision for economic aid.
Other proposals do not. It covers the full range of bilateral and multilateral economic assistance, and it confronts global issues.
It is a mutually-reinforcing but limited set of goals.
It addresses fundamental national interests, expresses
basic American values and can attract wide support.
Some argue that we should focus our economic assistance on only one of these goals, such as sustainable development. Others argue that these goals are so general that they contain all the current aid objectives and thus are not focused enough. Still others argue that this set of goals suffers from inherent conflicts among development, commercial, and security interests.
In response, we need a strategic vision for economic aid that can cover all existing aid programs; that expresses Table 1 in Annex A summarizes the main tenets of these proposed foreign policy frameworks.
Although not shown in Table 1 (1) protecting U.S. physical security; (2) seeking economic prosperity of the U.S. and the world; and (3) projecting American values abroad.
